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INTRODUCTION
A fine line exists between a State limiting the people’s right to
bear arms and infringing upon that right. The Second Amendment
provides, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be
infringed,”1 and yet a State may limit this right through legislation.2
The extent to which state governments may push the boundaries,
however, is not clear.3 Recently, in Illinois, the government regulated
the concealed carrying of firearms by enacting the Illinois Firearm
Concealed Carry Act.4 Under the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry
Act, the government only allows a nonresident to apply for a
concealed carry license in Illinois if the nonresident lives in a state
with licensing standards “substantially similar” to those of Illinois and
has a concealed carry license in the state where they reside.5 Illinois


J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Recording Industry Studies, Butler University, 2017. Thank
you to my family and friends for their constant support, and to Hal Morris and
Eva Dickey for helping guide me through my legal writing process.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784–85 (2010).
3
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011).
4
Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Culp II].
5
Id. at 648-649.
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considers only four out of fifty states to qualify as having
“substantially similar” concealed carry licensing standards: Arkansas,
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.6
In Culp v. Raoul, nonresidents who held concealed carry licenses
in their home states challenged the constitutionality of the substantial
similarity provision of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act.7 The
Seventh Circuit found the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act
“respects the Second Amendment without offending the antidiscrimination principle at the heart of Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause.”8 Although Plaintiffs urged the Seventh Circuit to
apply a standard of strict scrutiny, the court was correct not to evaluate
the constitutionality of the substantial similarity requirement under a
strict scrutiny standard.9
The Seventh Circuit followed the district court decision and
applied intermediate scrutiny because the law burdens, but does not
ban the Second Amendment right to carry guns outside of the home.10
The Seventh Circuit recognizes intermediate scrutiny as a sliding
scale, allowing the court to apply a traditional form of intermediate
scrutiny or a more rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny.11 The more
rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny is known as “elevated
intermediate scrutiny.”12 The test for elevated intermediate scrutiny is
harder to pass than traditional intermediate scrutiny, but easier to pass
than strict scrutiny.13 Although the Seventh Circuit applied
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, the court failed to use
the correct form of intermediate scrutiny.14 The court should have
6

Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
8
Id. at 649.
9
Id. at 653-654.
10
See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655; Culp v. Madigan, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1054
(C.D. Ill. 2017) [hereinafter Culp I].
11
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
12
People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (1st) 153373, ¶ 26.
13
See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013); Ezell, 651
F.3d at 708; Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 530
(7th Cir. 2009).
14
Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
7
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applied elevated intermediate scrutiny rather than traditional
intermediate scrutiny.15
Because the Seventh Circuit in Culp failed to adopt a standard of
elevated intermediate scrutiny, the court failed to properly analyze the
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed
Carry Act.16 As a result, the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in finding
the substantial similarity requirement of the Act was constitutional.17
The substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm
Concealed Carry Act fails the rigorous review of elevated intermediate
scrutiny because the substantial similarity requirement is not a close fit
between the government’s means and its end. Thus, the substantial
similarity requirement is unconstitutional, and Illinois is overextending
its ability to limit people’s right to bear arms by not amending the
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed
Carry Act.18
First, this Note will provide a background regarding the history
and role of self-defense in Second Amendment issues, the different
standards of scrutiny, and several judicial decisions regarding gun
permit regulations and the scope of the Second Amendment. Second,
this Note will address why elevated intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate standard the Seventh Circuit should have used when
evaluating the Illinois substantial similarity requirement. Lastly, this
Note will discuss how the Seventh Circuit would have found the
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed
Carry Act unconstitutional if it assessed the requirement under
elevated intermediate scrutiny.

15

See Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
See Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir. 2019); Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at
1054.
17
See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 649.
18
See id.
16
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Role of Self-Defense in Second Amendment Issues
Self-defense is often a driving factor courts consider in
determining whether gun restriction laws infringe Second Amendment
rights.19 The Second Amendment provides: “A well-regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”20 The Second
Amendment provided people the right to bear arms, and the Supreme
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller clarified for the first time
whether the right to bear arms applied to individuals.21 The Court
found the language regarding “a well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State” did not limit the scope of the
right to bear arms to the preservation of militias.22 As a result, the
court in Heller found the Second Amendment granted an individual
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.23 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court found prohibiting people from keeping handguns in
the home was unconstitutional because the Court recognized the
importance of people’s ability to defend themselves.24
The Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago also
recognized the correlation between the right to bear arms and the
importance of self-defense.25 The Supreme Court in McDonald found
the fundamental right of the Second Amendment is to bear arms for
self-defense, and that right applies to the States under the Due Process

19

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008); Wrenn v.
District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013).
20
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
21
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
22
U.S. CONST. amend. II.; Johnathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and
Our Nineteenth Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1492
(2014).
23
Meltzer, supra note 22, at 1492.
24
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
25
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010).
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Clause.26 Accordingly, the Court in McDonald found States cannot
pass legislation which infringes the rights individuals have under the
Second Amendment.27 However, many state and local governments
attempt to pass their own laws which may not merely limit people’s
right to bear arms, but bar people’s Second Amendment rights, and
thus people’s ability to defend themselves.28 Therefore, courts often
need to evaluate whether a state law which falls within the scope of
the Second Amendment is a mere limitation, or if it infringes the rights
people have under the Second Amendment and is unconstitutional.29
B. Applying a Heightened Standard of Scrutiny in Second
Amendment Cases
Courts generally use a standard of scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of state laws.30 The Seventh Circuit, among other
Circuits, has used a two-part approach to determine whether
constitutional scrutiny should apply.31 First, following the twopronged approach inquiry, a law warrants a standard of scrutiny if “the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”32 If the first prong is met, the
second step of the inquiry is to apply an appropriate form of meansend scrutiny.33 There are three traditional scrutiny standards which a
court could apply: (1) a rational basis standard; (2) an intermediate
scrutiny standard; and (3) a strict scrutiny standard.34 However, a court
26

Id. at 791 (finding there is a private right to self-defense).
See id.
28
See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
29
See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666.
30
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
31
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d
792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010).
32
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
33
Id.
34
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
27
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can also choose to not apply any specific standard of scrutiny if the
court strongly believes the law “would fail constitutional muster.”35
The Seventh Circuit found “the rigor of this judicial review will
depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on the right.”36
Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of scrutiny.37 In order for a law
to warrant strict scrutiny, the law must restrict a person’s right to bear
arms at home.38 A peg below strict scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.39
Courts analyze state laws under a standard of intermediate scrutiny if
the law imposes a burden on the Second Amendment outside the
home.40 Lastly, a court could choose to apply the lowest standard of
scrutiny, the rational basis standard.41 However, the Supreme Court’s
reference to constitutional scrutiny standards in Heller meant any
“heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court specifically excluded
rational-basis review.”42 For this reason, courts should never analyze a
state law which imposes a burden on the Second Amendment under a
rational basis standard of review.43
C. Judicial Decisions on Gun Permit Regulations and the Scope
of the Second Amendment
The Supreme Court set the foundation of precedent regarding gun
regulations and the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v.
35

See id. at 628-629.
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.
37
Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 547 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir.
2008).
38
Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (interprets
core of Second Amendment to be self-defense in the home but Heller never
says that, rather Heller finds self-defense in general is the core of the Second
Amendment and the home is where need for self-defense is most acute).
39
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
40
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701
F.3d at 93.
41
Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 692 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
42
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
43
Id.
36
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Heller.44 In Heller, the Supreme Court found the District of
Columbia's prohibition on possessing handguns in the home
unconstitutional.45 The Supreme Court in Heller reasoned the District
of Columbia’s law substantially infringed the core component of the
Second Amendment, an individual’s right to self-defense.46
Furthermore, the District’s prohibition significantly affected the right
to self-defense in the home.47 The Supreme Court found the home is
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute,” and to prohibit the protection of one’s home with a handgun,
“the quintessential self-defense weapon,” was unconstitutional.48 The
Supreme Court in Heller did not apply a specific standard of scrutiny,
but found regardless of the standard applied, the prohibition would fail
the test.49
The Court expanded this holding in McDonald v. City of
Chicago.50 The Court found the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms also applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.51 Consequently, McDonald opened the
floodgates for States to regulate gun possession because the Supreme
Court in Heller never found the need for self-defense was nonexistent
outside the home.52 By McDonald incorporating the Second
Amendment to the States when Heller inferred self-defense existed
outside the home, States were free to regulate and attempt to ban
people’s use of guns in public.
In Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit found an Illinois law
which prohibited the carrying of a gun in public, loaded or unloaded,

David B. Kopel and Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 200 (2017).
45
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
46
Id. at 630.
47
Id. at 628.
48
Id. at 628-629.
49
Id.
50
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
51
Id. at 791.
52
See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (where the court
found the need for self-defense exists outside the home as well).
44
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violated the Second Amendment.53 Although the Court in Heller and
McDonald recognized the need for self-defense was most acute in the
home, the Seventh Circuit recognized that Heller and McDonald never
concluded self-defense is not acute outside the home.54 The court
found reasonable limitations, consistent with the Second Amendment,
can be placed to regulate guns outside the home.55 However, blanket
bans which infringe the core of the Second Amendment, the right to
self-defense, are not reasonable and do not warrant a standard of
scrutiny.56 Thus, the court in Moore followed the framework of Heller
and chose not to apply a standard of scrutiny because the regulation
was an unjustified blanket ban on the core of the Second Amendment,
and was unconstitutional.57 Therefore, according to the Seventh
Circuit, the core of the Second Amendment is personal self-defense,
not only self-defense in the home, expanding the framework of Heller
outside the home.58
Following Heller, courts are split on whether a level of scrutiny
should be applied in assessing restrictions to the Second Amendment,
or if no standard of scrutiny is appropriate because the law is bound to
be unconstitutional.59 For example, some States established good
reason laws, which allow individuals to carry a firearm only if they
provide a good reason.60 But courts are in disagreement whether the
good reason restrictions warrant a standard of scrutiny or if they are
bound to fail constitutional muster.61
In Woollard v. Gallagher, a Fourth Circuit court addressed
whether Maryland’s requirement for a person to have a good and
substantial reason to “carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public”
53

Id. at 942.
Id. at 935.
55
Id. at 942.
56
Id. at 940 (finding a great justification would be needed but there is no
possible justification for such a broad ban).
57
Id. at 941.
58
See id.
59
See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
60
See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
61
See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
54
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was constitutional under the Second Amendment.62 The court in
Woollard found Maryland’s law imposed a substantial burden on
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, and consequently
applied a standard of intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the
law was constitutional.63 In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Wrenn v. District of Columbia also addressed a good reason
law.64 However, the court in Wrenn found the District’s good reason
law for carrying a gun outside the home did not warrant a standard of
scrutiny and ruled the law was unconstitutional.65 Therefore, courts are
split on whether an intermediate standard of scrutiny should apply to
Second Amendment restrictions, whether strict scrutiny should apply,
or whether a court should treat Second Amendment restrictions like
the handgun ban in Heller and not apply any standard of scrutiny
because the law is bound to fail.66
II. WHY ELEVATED INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IS THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE USED WHEN
EVALUATING THE ILLINOIS SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
REQUIREMENT
This Part evaluates why the standard of elevated intermediate
scrutiny is the appropriate standard for the Supreme Court to use when
evaluating the concealed carry license regulation. In applying the twopronged approach, a law warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny if
“the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment.”67 The next step is to apply an
“appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.”68 While courts often
present the inquiry as a two-part inquiry, the first part of the inquiry
can be split into two sub-parts: (1) whether the law in question falls
62

Woollard, 712 F.3d at 871.
Id. at 876.
64
Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655.
65
Id. at 666.
66
See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
67
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875.
68
Id.
63
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within the scope of the conduct under the Second Amendment; and (2)
whether the law in question imposes a burden on such conduct.69 As
found by the courts in Woollard and Wrenn, good reason laws fall
within the scope of conduct addressed in the Second Amendment.70
Furthermore, while the court in Wrenn did not find the good reason
law was constitutional, the court nevertheless found the law fell within
the scope of conduct addressed in the Second Amendment.71
Similar to good reasons laws, Illinois's substantial similarity
requirement falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. The
Second Amendment sets out the right of the people to bear arms both
inside and outside of the home.72 Like good reason laws, Illinois’s
substantial similarity requirement falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment because the substantial similarity requirement relates to
people’s ability to carry guns outside the home.73 To complete the first
step of the two-pronged approach, a court must determine whether the
substantial similarity requirement burdens the people’s rights to bear
arms under the Second Amendment.74
A.

Illinois’s Substantial Similarity Requirement Imposes a
Substantial Burden on Second Amendment Rights

Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement places a substantial
burden on the rights falling under the Second Amendment. A law
burdens the rights of the Second Amendment if it negatively impacts a
person’s ability to use a firearm for self-defense.75 However, rather
than creating a roadblock, if a law completely prohibits a person from
exercising their right to have a firearm for self-defense, it is
“appropriate to strike down such ‘total ban[s]’ without bothering to

69

See id.
See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868.
71
Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661.
72
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
73
Id.
74
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875.
75
See id. at 876.
70
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apply tiers of scrutiny because no such analysis could ever sanction
obliterations of an enumerated constitutional right.”76
In Wrenn, the court found the good reason law did not simply
impose a burden on the rights which fall under the Second
Amendment, but rather the good reason law essentially completely
barred people from their Second Amendment right.77 The good reason
law was not a flat-out total ban because some people, but not all, were
allowed to carry a gun under the regulation. For example, if a person
provided a good reason, they could carry a gun.78 However, the court
in Wrenn found the exception did not preclude the good reason law
from being viewed as a total ban because the law made it impossible
for guns to be available to each responsible citizen.79 Thus, the court
found good reason laws were “necessarily a total ban” because the law
ultimately had the same effect as the handgun ban in Heller.80
Similar to the good reason laws in Wrenn, the Illinois substantial
similarity requirement shares characteristics of being essentially a total
ban. The Illinois substantial similarity requirement virtually makes it
impossible for most nonresidents to carry a gun.81 As provided by the
substantial similarity requirement, a nonresident who does not live in a
state with substantially similar concealed carry requirements is not
able to apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.82 “To determine
which states have substantially similar regulatory schemes, Illinois
undertakes a survey process. The State Police send a survey to all
other states seeking information regarding their regulation of firearm
possession and related criminal history and mental health reporting.”83
Only four states qualify as having “substantially similar” concealed
carry licensing standards: Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and
Virginia.84
76

Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665.
Id. at 666.
78
Id. at 665.
79
Id. at 665-666.
80
Id.
81
Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2019).
82
Id. at 648-649.
83
Id. at 651.
84
Id.
77
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Importantly, the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act does not
provide a stricter application for nonresidents to obtain a concealed
carry license in Illinois.85 Rather, the substantial similarity provision
outright denies nonresidents who do not reside in Arkansas,
Mississippi, Texas, or Virginia from applying for an Illinois concealed
carry license, regardless of whether they lack a criminal history or do
not suffer from mental illness.86 Thus, it is impossible for ordinarily
situated residents of forty-five states to assert their Second
Amendment right in Illinois via a concealed carry license.87
However, while the substantial similarity provision makes it
impossible for nonresidents of forty-five states to obtain a concealed
carry license in Illinois, “[i]ndividuals living outside a substantially
similar state are not without firearm privileges in Illinois.”88
According to the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act, nonresidents
who hold a concealed carry permit in the state which they reside are
legally able to possess a gun in their vehicle while driving in Illinois.89
The Illinois Firearm Owners Identification Card Act also grants
certain gun privileges to nonresidents who are authorized to possess a
firearm in their home state.90 According the Illinois Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act, nonresidents who are authorized to possess a
firearm in their home state may legally possess a gun in Illinois “while
on their own premises or in the home of an Illinois resident with
permission, . . . while hunting, . . . and while engaging in target
practice at a firing or shooting range.”91 Furthermore, if a firearm is
enclosed in a case and unloaded, it is legal for nonresidents to possess
it in Illinois.92 However, nonresidents’ gun privileges regarding the
85

See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101591)
86
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 651.
87
See id.
88
Id. at 652.
89
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-591).
90
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40(b)(10) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101591).
91
Id.
92
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(b)(9) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101591); Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652.
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ability to carry a gun for hunting, for target practice, and to enclose an
unloaded firearm in a case are not directly related to situations where a
person would use a firearm for self-defense. But ultimately, because
guns are legally available for all nonresidents to a degree, the
substantial similarity law is not a total ban.93
Because the substantial similarity requirement does not act as a
total ban, the court in Culp was correct to analyze the requirement
with constitutional scrutiny like the court in Woollard.94 In Woollard,
the petitioner challenged Maryland’s good reason law to carry guns
outside the home.95 The court found the good reason law did not
completely bar individuals from their rights under the Second
Amendment, but found the law burdened those rights.96 As a result,
the court in Woollard chose to apply constitutional scrutiny rather than
find the law outright unconstitutional because it was bound to fail any
test.97
Similar to the good reason law, the substantial similarity
requirement still acts as a burden on people’s Second Amendment
rights even if it does not totally bar them from exercising their rights.
Like the good reason law in Woollard, the Illinois substantial
similarity requirement applies only to the concealed carrying of a gun
in public.98 The substantial similarity requirement prohibits
nonresidents who do not reside in a substantially similar state from
using firearms for self-defense outside their home unless they have a
concealed carry license in their resident state and are traveling in a
vehicle, or are on their own premises or in the home of an Illinois
resident who granted permission.99 Yet, there is no way for
nonresidents who live outside of a substantially similar state to walk in
public with a concealed firearm for the purpose of self-defense as
93

Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
94
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
95
Id. at 868-870.
96
See id. at 875.
97
Id. at 876.
98
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652.
99
Id. at 648-649, 652.
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granted by the Second Amendment.100 Ultimately, because the
substantial similarity requirement does not act as a total ban but
greatly hinders people’s ability to assert their Second Amendment
right, the substantial similarity requirement is a significant burden on
people’s Second Amendment right.101
B. Intermediate Scrutiny as the Applicable Tier of Scrutiny
Because the substantial similarity requirement places a burden on
the rights afforded by the Second Amendment, the next step in the
inquiry is to determine which tier of scrutiny to apply.102 The more a
law burdens the core of the Second Amendment, the higher the tier of
scrutiny a court applies when analyzing its constitutionality.103
According to the Supreme Court in Heller, the core of the Second
Amendment is self-defense104 and the home is “where the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”105 Consequently,
any law which burdens the core of the Second Amendment where it is
most acute warrants strict scrutiny.106 In other words, a law hindering
a person’s ability to bear arms for self-defense at home warrants strict
scrutiny.107
For example, in Gowder v. City of Chicago, the district court found
strict scrutiny was appropriate to analyze a Chicago ordinance which
barred non-violent misdemeanants from receiving a permit to possess
a firearm at home.108 The court found strict scrutiny was appropriate
100

See id. at 652.
See id. at 648-649, 652.
102
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875.
103
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
104
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).
105
Id. at 628.
106
See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d
1110, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
107
See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
108
Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1117, 1123. (the court chose to apply strict
scrutiny but because the law was a total ban, the court could have chosen not to
analyze the law under constitutional scrutiny and find it per se
unconstitutional).
101
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because the ordinance “directly restrict[ed] the core Second
Amendment right of armed self-defense in one's home.”109 Therefore,
a law warrants a strict scrutiny analysis if it restricts a person’s ability
to bear arms for self-defense at home.110
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to a
burden to Second Amendment rights outside of the home.111 First,
courts have not rejected intermediate scrutiny like they have rejected
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for restrictions to the Second
Amendment.112 For example, the court in Kachalsky v. City of
Westchester found “applying less than strict scrutiny when the
regulation does not burden the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the
home makes eminent sense.”113 In addition, the court in Woollard
found rather than strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny was the
appropriate standard to apply to laws which burden the rights of the
Second Amendment outside the home.114
While the court in Kachalsky found it should apply less than strict
scrutiny for laws burdening Second Amendment rights outside the
home, the rational basis standard is not appropriate for analyzing the
substantial similarity requirement.115 “Almost all circuit cases agree

109

Id. at 1124. (the core of the Second Amendment is self-defense, not selfdefense in the home, but the home is where self-defense is most acute).
110
See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
111
See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
112
See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.; Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th
Cir. 2012).
113
Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012).
114
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
115
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n. 27 (2008) (rational
basis review “could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature
may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it . . . the right to keep and bear
arms . . . If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no
effect.”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701 (“For our purposes,
however, we know that Heller’s reference to ‘any standard of scrutiny’ means
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that any law which burdens Second Amendment rights must receive
something stricter than rational basis review.”116 The Second Circuit
incorrectly found laws which burden the Second Amendment but not
to a substantial degree warrant a rational basis standard.117 However,
the Supreme Court in Heller “very explicitly rejected mere rational
basis review for all regulations that burden the Second Amendment, to
any degree.”118 Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
tier of scrutiny to apply for a burden to Second Amendment rights
outside of the home.119
Courts can apply intermediate scrutiny traditionally or more
rigorously.120 In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs claimed a
Chicago ordinance which required firing-range training as prerequisite
to lawful gun ownership, but prohibited all firing ranges in city,
violated their Second Amendment rights.121 Because the Chicago
ordinance curtailed the rights of law-abiding citizens and came very
close to “implicating the core of the Second Amendment,” the court
applied a more rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny.122 The test the
court applied was harder to pass than intermediate scrutiny, but not as
rigorous as strict scrutiny.123
While traditional intermediate scrutiny requires the government to
show: (1) its action sought to advance a substantial government
interest; and (2) there is a reasonable fit between the contested law and
the governmental objectives,124 the court in Ezell required the
government to show: (1) “an extremely strong public-interest
justification;” and (2) “a close fit” between the government’s means
any heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court specifically excluded rationalbasis review.”)
116
Kopel and Greenlee, supra note 44, at 274.
117
Id. at 288.
118
Id. at 289.
119
See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93.
120
See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
121
Id. at 689-690.
122
Id. at 708.
123
Id.
124
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013).
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and its end.”125 Thus, the test in Ezell is more rigorous because it
requires a showing of “extremely strong” public-interest rather than
“substantial” government interest and requires a “close fit” between
the law and the government’s goal rather than a “reasonable fit.”126
However, it does not reach the level of strict scrutiny because under
strict scrutiny, the government must show: (1) the law is “necessary to
serve a compelling state interest;” and (2) the law was “narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.”127 In People v. Bell, the court referred
to the test applied in Ezell as “elevated intermediate scrutiny.”128
The court in Culp v. Raoul should have applied elevated
intermediate scrutiny rather than traditional intermediate scrutiny. Like
the plaintiffs in Ezell, the plaintiffs in Culp were not criminals or
misdemeanants.129 Rather, the plaintiffs in Culp were also “‘lawabiding, responsible citizens’ whose Second Amendment rights are
entitled to full solicitude.”130 Furthermore, the substantial similarity
requirement assessed in Culp is a severe burden on nonresidents and is
closely proximate to the core of the Second Amendment. The
substantial similarity requirement is a severe burden because it
effectively bans nonresidents of forty-five states from applying for a
concealed carry license, and thus greatly restricts their ability to use
firearms for self-defense in Illinois.131 In addition, the effect of the
substantial similarity requirement has the potential to impact
significantly more people than the ordinance in Ezell.132 Therefore, the
substantial similarity requirement should have been analyzed under the
same standard in Ezell, the standard of elevated intermediate
scrutiny.133

125

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708;
127
Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir.
2009).
128
People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (1st) 153373, ¶ 26.
129
Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2019); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
130
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652.
131
Id. at 653-654.
132
Culp I, 840 F.3d 400, 407 (7th Cir. 2016) (Manion, D. dissenting).
133
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
126
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In sum, the substantial similarity requirement is within the scope
of the Second Amendment and substantially burdens people’s Second
Amendment rights.134 While the requirement is a substantial burden, it
is not a total ban because the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act and
the Illinois Firearm Owners Identification Card Act grant certain gun
privileges to nonresidents.135 Because the law is not a total ban, it
warrants constitutional scrutiny.136 Intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate tier of scrutiny because the law does not restrict a
nonresident’s ability to bear arms in their home.137
Although intermediate scrutiny is appropriate over rational basis or
strict scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit in Culp failed to use a more
rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny known as “elevated
intermediate scrutiny.”138 The court should have applied elevated
intermediate scrutiny because the plaintiffs in Culp were law-abiding,
responsible citizens, the substantially similarity requirement is a
severe burden to people’s Second Amendment rights, and the
requirement comes close to the core of the Second Amendment, the
right to bear arms for self-defense.139 Hence, elevated intermediate
scrutiny is the appropriate standard the Seventh Circuit should have
used when evaluating the Illinois substantial similarity requirement.
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY PERMITTING REGULATION IS
NOT CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT FAILS UNDER ELEVATED
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY

134

Culp II, 921 F.3d at 653-654 (the requirement prohibits nonresidents of
forty-five states from applying for a concealed carry gun license).
135
Id. at 652; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665-666
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
136
See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648-649, 652; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
876 (4th Cir. 2013).
137
See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012);
138
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655.
139
See id. at 652-654; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir.
2011).
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This Part analyzes the application of the elevated intermediate
scrutiny standard to the Illinois substantial similarity requirement
under the Second Amendment, and as a result, establishes the Seventh
Circuit should have found the substantial similarity requirement
unconstitutional. In Culp, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the contested
requirement under a normal standard of intermediate scrutiny. Under a
normal standard of intermediate scrutiny, the government must show:
(1) its action sought to advance a substantial government interest; and
(2) there is a reasonable fit between the substantial similarity
requirement and the governmental objectives.140 However, the Seventh
Circuit should have analyzed the substantial similarity requirement
with elevated intermediate scrutiny. In order to satisfy elevated
intermediate scrutiny, the government must show: (1) “an extremely
strong public-interest justification;” and (2) “a close fit between the
government's means and its end.”141
A. Illinois’s Extremely Strong Public Safety Interest
In Culp v. Raoul, the court assessed the substantial similarity
requirement with the traditional form of intermediate scrutiny.142
According the principles of traditional intermediate scrutiny, Illinois
had the burden of showing it prohibited nonresidents outside of
substantially similar states from applying for an Illinois concealed
carry license to advance a substantial government interest.143 Illinois
made clear its ultimate interest was keeping the public safe.144 Rather
than Illinois having the burden of showing its action was to advance a
substantial government interest, elevated intermediate scrutiny
requires Illinois to show it had an “extremely strong public-interest
justification” in passing the substantial similarity requirement.145 The
Seventh Circuit would only have to look at the strength of Illinois’s
140

See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013).
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
142
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655.
143
See Drake, 724 F.3d at 436.
144
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648.
145
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
141
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public-interest reasoning in applying elevated intermediate scrutiny
because public-interest was Illinois’s justification under traditional
intermediate scrutiny and the substantial similarity requirement passed
such review.146
Illinois’s primary concern is keeping people with a history of
criminality or mental illness from receiving concealed carry
licenses.147 While the core component of the Second Amendment is
the right to keep and bear arms for individual self-defense, the
Supreme Court in Heller found there are longstanding regulations
which limit the scope of the Second Amendment, such as bans on gun
possession by felons and mentally ill people.148 Courts have followed
the longstanding right recognized in Heller to categorically ban
firearm possession by felons and mentally ill people.149 In United
States v. Shields, the Seventh Circuit found “keeping firearms out of
the hands of violent felons is an important objective.”150 In Tyler v.
Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit found the
government had a compelling interest for wanting to keep
presumptively risky people, such as people with mental illness, from
possessing firearms.151
Further, while traditional intermediate scrutiny does not require a
“compelling” government interest, many courts have found the
government’s interest in public safety is a “compelling reason.”152
Therefore, because courts often find a government’s interest in public
safety compelling under traditional intermediate scrutiny, the court in
Culp would have likely found the government had a strong publicsafety interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of felons and
mentally ill people under elevated intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the
substantial similarity requirement would likely have satisfied the first
146

See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648.
148
District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
149
See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir.
2016); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750 (7th Cir. 2015).
150
Shields, 789 F.3d at 750.
151
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693.
152
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 473 (4th Cir. 2011).
147
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prong of analysis under elevated intermediate scrutiny.153 However,
the government must also show that the substantial similarity
requirement was a close fit for ensuring mentally ill people and felons
were not able to attain concealed carry licenses.154
B. The Substantial Similarity Requirement is Not a Close Fit
While the Seventh Circuit would likely have found Illinois’s
public-safety interest in ensuring people with a record of criminality or
mental illness did not possess firearms was extremely strong, the
government would likely fail to show the substantial similarity
requirement was a close fit to meet the government’s goal. First, the
court would have to analyze the rationale behind the constructed law
before determining how closely the law fits the desired goal.
1. Illinois’s Rationale Behind the Substantial Similarity
Requirement
The Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act provides for an
applicant to obtain a concealed carry license, the applicant must show,
among other things,
that he is not a clear and present danger to himself or a threat
to public safety and, within the past five years, has not been a
patient in a mental hospital, convicted of a violent
misdemeanor or two or more violations of driving under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, or participated in a residential or
court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program.155
The Act also requires the State Police conduct a thorough
background check of each applicant.156 Further, because a concealed
153

See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
See Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2019); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (7th
Cir. 2011).
155
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 650.
156
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/35 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-591).
154
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carry license lasts for five years, the Act requires ongoing monitoring
so the State can revoke any licensee of their license if any
disqualifying circumstances arise.157 For example, if a concealed carry
license holder involuntarily becomes an inpatient at a mental health
facility, the person’s concealed carry license would be revoked.158
However, implementing the initial and ongoing background
checks on nonresidents is a challenge for the Illinois government.159
“Illinois does not have access to other states’ criminal history
databases or mental health repositories. Nor are other States required
to provide this information to Illinois or, more generally, to include the
information in a national database to which the Illinois State Police
have access.”160 Because Illinois could not access records of
nonresidents, Illinois found if nonresidents were qualified to have a
concealed carry license in their home state, and the requirements of
their home state were substantially similar to those of Illinois, then
they could apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.161
The law of another state is deemed ‘substantially similar’ if the
[S]tate, like Illinois, (1) regulates who may carry firearms in
public; (2) prohibits those with involuntary mental health
admissions, and those with voluntary admissions within the
past five years, from carrying firearms in public; (3) reports
denied persons to the FBI’s National Instant Criminal
Background System; and (4) participates in reporting persons
authorized to carry firearms in public through the National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System.162

157

See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/70 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101591); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8/1(West, Westlaw through P.A. 101591).
158
See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 650.
159
See id. at 651.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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Through this system, Illinois knows that if a person in a
substantially similar state has a concealed carry license, then they were
not a criminal or mentally ill at the time they received their license.163
Furthermore, because the substantially similar state must also report
persons authorized to carry through a national system, Illinois will
know if at any point during a person’s five-year licensing period that
the person’s license is revoked in their home state.164 Thus, Illinois
uses states with substantially similar concealed carry requirements as a
proxy to solve its information deficit issue.165
2. Why the Substantial Similarity Requirement is Not a Close Fit
to Illinois’s Goal
Although Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement solves the
government’s information deficit issue and helps ensure criminals and
mentally ill people cannot receive a concealed carry permit in Illinois,
the requirement is not closely fit to achieve the government’s goal.
Only four states meet Illinois’s criteria for having substantially similar
gun licensing requirements.166 As a result, nonresidents of forty-five
states are unable to apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.167 The
substantial similarity requirement thus negatively impacts the majority
of America.168
Most importantly, Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement is
both extremely overinclusive and underinclusive.169 For example, an
Illinois resident who has a holding permit can travel to Missouri to be
a patient in a mental-health clinic, then return to Illinois without the
government ever knowing.170 Also, a person could live in one or
several of the dissimilar states for multiple years, then move to one of
163

See id.
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See id.
168
See id.
169
Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting).
170
Id.
164
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the four substantially similar states, thus “automatically becoming
eligible to apply for a license even though ‘Illinois (and, presumably,
the substantially similar state as well) [would be] unable to obtain
information about his possible criminal or mental problems in those
states.’”171 And yet, the most qualified, reasonable person may not
obtain an Illinois carrying license if they are a nonresident from a
dissimilar state.172 For example, “a colonel in the United States Air
Force licensed as a concealed-carry instructor in Illinois cannot apply
for a concealed-carry license of his own because he is a resident of
Pennsylvania.”173
While the government is aware of the overinclusive and
underinclusive nature of the substantial similarity requirement, it is
willing to accept the negative impact of the requirement to solve its
administrative difficulties.174 Without the substantial similarity
requirement, Illinois would be forced to obtain nonresident applicants’
information in a much more burdensome way.175 However, “the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”176
Therefore, depriving someone of a constitutional right cannot be
justified by simply avoiding cost and easing the administrative burden
on the government.177
Further, there are other methods to attaining an applicant’s
background information. “The State could modify its present practices
by, for example, requiring a sworn declaration on a nonresident’s
mental health from a treating physician or shifting more of the cost of
obtaining out-of-state criminal history information to the nonresident
applicant.”178 The Seventh Circuit in Culp recognized sufficient
alternatives to obtaining applicant’s information, but the Court found
issue with the government’s ability to continue monitoring license
171

Id. (quoting Culp I, 840 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2016)).
See id. 648-49 (majority opinion).
173
Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 660-61.
176
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
177
See id.
178
Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655.
172
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holders.179 Thus, the Court found the substantial similarity requirement
was reasonable and Illinois could rely on the national database to
monitor residents of substantially similar states.180
Illinois’s ultimate goal is to ensure mentally ill people and
criminals could not obtain a concealed carry license in Illinois, but the
system Illinois has in place regarding its substantial similarity
requirement is severely flawed for closely fitting that goal.181 First,
Illinois determines which states are substantially similar by sending
out a survey.182 The last survey Illinois sent out was in 2015.183 The
2015 survey recognized Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia
had substantially similar concealed carry licenses in place.184 Yet, the
survey prior to the 2015 survey was sent out in 2013, and recognized
that in addition to Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, the
concealed carry requirements in Hawaii, New Mexico and South
Carolina were substantially similar as well.185
Because Illinois did not find Hawaii’s, New Mexico’s and South
Carolina’s concealed carry requirements were substantially similar
from the 2015 survey, it suggests the laws in those states changed to
the point Illinois did not find them substantially similar.186 Not only
does it suggest a state’s concealed carry license requirements can
change, “it evidences that laws and practices can materially change in
a short amount of time.”187 However, Illinois has not sent out a survey
in four years.188 Thus, Illinois’s failure to send out a survey since 2015
and ensure the states it deemed substantially similar still meet that

179

Id.
See id.
181
Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting).
182
Id. at 651 (majority opinion)
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 659 (Manion, D., dissenting).
186
Id. at 662.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 651 (majority opinion) (the last survey sent was in 2015 and this
article was written in 2019).
180
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criteria “significantly undermines its argument that its system is
tailored to its goal.”189
Furthermore, Illinois’s reliance on other states barely provides the
up-to-date monitoring the government claims it needs.190 Illinois
considers Virginia and Arkansas to have substantially similar licensing
standards, and yet, Virginia and Arkansas rely on residents to report
any of their own mental health issues.191 If a resident of Virginia or
Arkansas does not self-report a mental health issue, then the state
government would not know that the resident should be disqualified
from having a concealed carry license.192 Consequently, the Illinois
government would not know either.193 Regardless, Illinois relies on the
systems in place in Virginia and Arkansas.194
In addition, it is dangerous for Illinois to rely on national
databases for monitoring license holders and background checks.195
For example, Illinois considers Mississippi a substantially similar
state, yet it can take over a year for the national database to be updated
with the record of a person’s felony conviction in Mississippi.196 The
same problems arise regarding mental-health records.197 Arkansas,
another state which Illinois considers substantially similar, reports its
mental health records “at a per-capita rate that is aberrantly low
compared to other states.”198 Hence, the deficiencies of the national
database system regarding background checks and ongoing monitoring
further prove Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement is not a close
fit to serve its goal.199
189

Id. at 662 (Manion, D., dissenting).
Id.
191
Id.
192
See id.
193
See id. at 651 (majority opinion).
194
Id. at 662 (Manion, D., dissenting).
195
See id.
196
Id.
197
See id.
198
Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance at 19-20, n. 29, Culp II, 921 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.
2019) (No. 17-2998)).
199
Id.
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Lastly, Illinois does not need to implement the substantial
similarity requirement for the government to continuously monitor
nonresidents who have concealed carry licenses.200 Illinois could
require nonresidents to “submit verified, quarterly updates on their
statuses, including quarterly mental-health certifications,” rather than
rely on the national database and its known deficiencies.201 This
system would provide “timely and accurate information the national
databases cannot guarantee.”202 Further, Illinois could utilize this
measure only for states which were not substantially similar if the
government changes its frequency of surveying substantially similar
state residents.203 As a result, all law abiding, responsible citizens of
the United States would be able to apply for a nonresident concealed
carry license.204 But currently, given the several problems associated
with Illinois’s system and the substantial similarity requirement, the
Seventh Circuit would not find there is a close fit between Illinois’s
substantial similarity requirement and the government’s goal to keep
firearms from felons and mentally ill people.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s erroneous decision in Culp v. Raoul invites
a detailed exploration into the analysis for burdens to the Second
Amendment. In analyzing laws which burden the Second Amendment,
a court will apply a higher tier of constitutional scrutiny based on the
severity of the burden and the proximity of the law to the core of the
Second Amendment. However, if a law acts as a total ban on people’s
Second Amendment rights rather than a burden, a court may choose
not to apply any standard of scrutiny because the law is bound to be
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in Heller v. District of Columbia
did just that. The Court evaluated the constitutionality of a city
prohibition on possessing handguns in the home and found the
200

See id.
Id.
202
Id.
203
See id.
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Id.
201
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prohibition unconstitutional without analyzing the law under any
standard of constitutional scrutiny. Although it did not apply any
scrutiny, the Supreme Court in Heller explicitly rejected mere rational
basis review for any regulations that burden the Second Amendment,
to any degree.
Heller was also very important because it recognized the core of
the Second Amendment is a person’s right to bear arms for selfdefense. The prohibition in Heller impacted the ability to bear arms in
the home, and the Supreme Court noted the home is where the need
for self-defense is most acute. However, the Seventh Circuit in Moore
v. Madigan, found that although the Court recognized the need for
self-defense was most acute in the home, the Court never concluded
self-defense is not acute outside the home. The Seventh Circuit in
Moore evaluated a prohibition on the carrying of guns in public and
found the prohibition unconstitutional without basing its decision on a
degree of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not
interpret Heller to find that the core of the Second Amendment must
be limited to the context of that case, the home. Rather the Seventh
Circuit should broadly interpret the core of the Second Amendment to
be self-defense in nearly any location.
In Culp v. Raoul, the Seventh Circuit applied intermediate
scrutiny to evaluate the burden of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry
Act on nonresidents and found the requirement was constitutional. The
court needed to apply constitutional scrutiny because the substantial
similarity requirement had an exception which made guns lawfully
available to all nonresidents who were licensed in their home state,
such as the right to travel with a firearm in a car or at their own home
in Illinois. Thus, the right to possess guns in Illinois is available to all
nonresidents, but it is impossible for a nonresident of a state that does
not have substantially similar requirements to get an Illinois concealed
carry license.
Further, the court was correct not to apply strict scrutiny. Second
Amendment restrictions typically only warrant strict scrutiny if the
law burdens the right to possess a firearm in the home. And based on
the exceptions to the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act, the Act
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does not strip a nonresident’s right to possess a firearm in their home
in Illinois.
The court found the requirement constitutional under traditional
intermediate scrutiny. The court found the requirement sought to
advance ensuring criminals and mentally ill people did not obtain
guns, and the requirement was reasonably fit to achieve that interest.
But while intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate tier of scrutiny to
analyze the substantial similarity requirement, the Seventh Circuit has
recognized intermediate scrutiny as a sliding scale. The Seventh
Circuit has recognized there is a more rigorous form of intermediate
scrutiny than traditional intermediate scrutiny. The more rigorous form
of intermediate scrutiny is known as elevated intermediate scrutiny.
Under elevated intermediate scrutiny, the government must show:
(1) an extremely strong public-interest justification, and (2), a close fit
between the government's means and its end. The Seventh Circuit in
Culp failed to apply elevated intermediate scrutiny in its analysis of
the substantial similarity requirement. The requirement warranted such
an analysis because the law placed a severe burden on nonresidents of
forty-five states to fully assert their right to bear arms. Furthermore,
the law came into close proximity with the core of the Second
Amendment, people’s ability to defend themselves.
The government had an extremely strong public interest
justification, but the Seventh Circuit would have found the
requirement was not closely fit to achieve the government’s goal. The
requirement was extremely underinclusive and overinclusive, and the
system in place is flawed. Further, there are other methods that may be
more of an administrative burden but solve these problems. Therefore,
if the Seventh Circuit in Culp applied an analysis of elevated
intermediate scrutiny as it should have, the court would have found
that the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act is unconstitutional.
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